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Abstract: G. W. Leibniz famously proclaimed that this is the best of all possible
worlds. One of the properties of the best world is its increasing perfection. He
gave a prominent role in his discussion of emotions to hope, which is related
to intellectual activity such as curiosity and courage, which in turn is essential
for the practice of science and the promotion of the common good. Leibniz
regarded hope as a process in which minute perceptions in the mind, that is,
unconscious promises or signs of a future pleasure, or joy, of the mind may
accumulate to an expectation that we become aware of, the passion of hope.
Related to a moral instinct of striving for joy and avoiding sorrow, hope moti-
vates us to promote perfection, which produces joy in us and eventually leads
to happiness.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) famously proclaimed that this is the best
of all possible worlds. He never thought, however, that it would be defined as
a static collection of substances in a perfect pre-established harmony. At all
times the monads are undergoing a dynamic change. Furthermore, he thought
(although his opinions on the topic varied at different times1) that the world
as a whole could increase in perfection. Given this dynamic essence of the best
of all possible worlds, it is no wonder that Leibniz gave an important role in
his discussion of emotions to hope which, along with joy and love, he regards
as a basic constituent of intellectual and moral advancement. Hope supports
our approaching perfection which, according to Leibniz, is the goal of human
action. In this paper I will first discuss Leibniz’s general theory of emotions
and then the characteristics of hope, its relation to joy and the place of hope
and joy in Leibniz’s perfectionism.
Disquiet and Passions
My point of departure is Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain
or New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, chapter xx, where he shows
how emotions arise and how they affect our deliberation. The work, written in
1 See Phemister 2006.
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1704, is a critique in dialogue form of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690).2
In E II, xx Locke relates good and evil with pleasure and pain (§ 2) and
argues that passions are modes of pleasure and pain. For Locke, pleasure and
pain are simple ideas of sensation and reflection and they are known by expe-
rience. Pleasure activates and motivates men’s actions and can be found in
objects and thoughts (§ 3). Pain has an opposing effect – we try to avoid it the
best we can although it is often produced by the same ideas and objects as
pleasure (§ 4).
Leibniz can agree with the basic subjective character of pleasure and pain,
although his conceptual framework is different. For him, pleasure and pain
are notable perceptions which affect us. But they are not simple ideas, as they
are built from aggregates or condensations of minute and confused percep-
tions.3 A single unconscious, minute perception does not have much effect on
its own but a larger whole of minute perceptions may become notable and
capture our attention.
According to Locke, men are driven to actions by the present uneasiness
they feel which is caused by the absence of some certain good they draw their
delight from.4 Positive emotion such as love or joy is a delight of the mind
whereas hate or sorrow is described as uneasiness. Uneasiness to Locke is
equivalent to desire in the sense that if man has no desire for a certain good,
he or she does not feel uneasiness. In this case one feels mere velleity or wish
which is an almost indifferent state. Also, if the desired good is impossible to
obtain, the uneasiness is “cured”. Uneasiness is for Locke the leading motive
for men’s actions and constitutes their passions (E II, xx, § 3–6).
In his answer in NE, II, xx, § 6 Leibniz again relies on his doctrine of
minute perceptions which constitute desire. Against Locke’s uneasiness Leib-
niz offers his own disquiet (inquiétude) which is more of a disposition to suffer
2 I use the following abbreviations: E refers to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing (Locke 1975), NE to Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding (Leibniz 1981
(RB; page numbers of RB are identical to A VI, 6 or Leibniz 1923-)), CSM to Descartes 1984,
GP to Leibniz 1880 and AG to Leibniz 1989.
3 Leibniz’s term for these minute perceptions is petit perception, little perception. He intro-
duced this doctrine in his 1684 work Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas. The con-
cept of minute or little perceptions of which we are not aware can be traced back to Thomas
Aquinas, but Leibniz seems to be the first to apply it systematically. See Kulstad & Carlin
2008, sec. 5.
4 Later in the Essay Locke argues that in us there are many uneasinesses always soliciting
and ready to determine the will, but the greatest and most pressing wins (E II, xxi, § 47; E,
263).
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rather than the suffering itself which Locke discusses.5 The nuance in meaning
proves to be of great importance when Leibniz argues that inquiétude fits fairly
well with “the nature of the thing itself”, but uneasiness (signifying suffering
which is understood as displeasure) does not. This is because desire is not the
suffering itself, but a disposition to suffering. In other words, a desire has to
be evident to be a real suffering. It has to be attended.
If you take “uneasiness” or disquiet to be a genuine displeasure, then I do not agree that
is all that spurs us on. What usually drives us are those minute insensible perceptions
which could be called sufferings that we cannot become aware of, if the notion of suffer-
ing did not involve awareness (NE II, xxi, § 36; RB, 188).
The insensible perceptions or “little urges” are usually not noted at all, which
Leibniz finds a good thing – in the opposite situation we would constantly feel
restless. He also argues that the unconscious nature of most of our dispositions
enable us to act quickly when needed, because our mind is not troubled by
the multiplicity of distinct perceptions (NE, II, xx, § 6). However, the minute
perceptions can combine and make themselves known within the whole, form-
ing a clear, but confused perception of pleasure, pain and the like.6 As exam-
ples Leibniz mentions the roar of the sea which is formed by the sound of each
wave put together (NE, Preface; RB, 54) and Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo who
eventually becomes aware that his foot is itching (II, xx, § 6; RB, 165).
Whereas for Locke pleasure or pain is a state, Leibniz thinks that they are
formed eventually as processes where the minute perceptions cumulate and
finally form a notable pleasure or pain which is attended and which might
lead the will into action.
[…] Nature has given us the spurs of desire in the form of the rudiments or elements of
suffering, semi-suffering one might say, or…of minute sufferings of which we cannot be
aware. This lets us enjoy the benefit of discomfort without enduring its inconveniences;
whereas our continual victory over these semi-sufferings […] provides us with many semi-
pleasures; and the continuation and accumulation of these […] eventually becomes a
whole, genuine pleasure (NE II, xx, § 6; RB, 165).
5 Leibniz’s choice of the term is related to Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s Essay.
Coste translates uneasiness as inquiétude which is not a strictly literal translation, signifying
a state where man is not quite at ease, lacking tranquillity of the soul. Later in II, xx, § 6
Leibniz defines disquiet as “imperceptible little urges which keep us constantly in sus-
pense.”
6 Clear, but confused perception is defined in Meditations as follows: “[clear cognition] is
confused when I cannot enumerate one by one marks sufficient for differentiating a thing
from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which
its notion can be resolved” (GP IV, 422; AG, 24).
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Against Locke Leibniz argues that we do not feel uneasiness all the time – our
perceptions of suffering are mostly minute semi-sufferings and only when they
accumulate and form a clear, but confused perception or genuine suffering,
we became aware of them. At the end of § 6 Leibniz employs the metaphor of
a clock, where a continual balance (in German, Unruhe, that is, disquiet) exists.
The clock can be taken as a model of our bodies which can never be at ease.
Each tiny change affects the other parts of the body and forces it to restore its
former balance. Thus there is a perpetual conflict which makes up the constant
disquiet of the clock/body.7
The semi-sufferings which eventually form genuine suffering can be over-
come. When we gain victory over these minute sufferings, each in turn, we get
semi-pleasures which eventually form a genuine pleasure when the number or
effect of semi-pleasures exceeds the number or effect of semi-sufferings. Thus
Leibniz regards pleasure or pain as a sum of inclinations aligned in a certain
direction. When the direction is to the good, we get pleasure and when the
direction is to the evil, we get pain. They are also related to the clarity of
perceptions – the more clear perceptions we have, the more pleasure we can
get and the more confused perceptions we have, the more suffering will ensue.
Pleasure and pain come in degrees and there is no complete change.8
This account of tiny aids, imperceptible little escapes and releases of thwarted endeavour
[tendence], which finally generate notable pleasure, also provides a somewhat more dis-
tinct knowledge of our inevitably confused ideas of pleasure and of pain; just as the
sensation of warmth or of light results from many tiny motions […] (NE II, xx, § 6, RB,165)
For Locke, passions are modes of pleasure and pain and are constituted by
uneasiness or delight. Pain or uneasiness is the ultimate motivator, but passion
gives our actions and thoughts a direction, the goal to strive towards.9 Locke
thinks that the notion of unconscious pleasure and pain is simply absurd (E
II, i, § 1) and does not regard desires and volitions as opposed forces like
Descartes does (Passions of the soul I, § 17; CSM I, 335). Because uneasiness
usually takes the form of a passion, the will is determined by it. The only way
7 Leibniz often speaks of the body as an automata or a machine. See, for example. Leibniz’s
comments on note L to Bayle’s Dictionnaire, article Rorarius (GP IV, 533–54), written around
the same time as NE, and Monadology, § 64.
8 This is very typical of Leibniz’s world-view. He frequently says that nature makes no
leaps – change is gradual and always consists of several intermediary steps. For the contin-
uum in nature, see Leibniz’s letter to Nouvelles de la république des lettre, July, 1687 (reply
to Malebranche), GP III, 51–55.
9 Bradfield 2002, 86. As we will see a little later, this description fits Leibniz’s theory of
passions also despite major differences in Locke’s and Leibniz’s epistemology.
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for the will to be active is its ability to suspend or postpone action to examine
evidence for or against some action.10
Leibniz explains different passions in different ways in points 7–17 of NE,
II, xx, although the basic components are in all cases the minute perceptions.
While Locke’s uneasiness is at worst a pressing, violent and conscious striving
for some known absent good, Leibniz’s spurs of desire are just some general
restlessness: “These impulses are like so many little springs trying to unwind
and so driving our machine along” (NE II, xx, § 6; RB, 166). However, disquiet
is an essential part of all passions: “Disquiet occurs not merely in uncomforta-
ble passions such as aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, but also in their oppo-
sites, love, hope, calmness, generosity and pride” (NE II, xxi, § 39; RB, 192). It
is always related to pleasure or pain or perfection or imperfection:
I believe that fundamentally pleasure is a sense of perfection, and pain a sense of imper-
fection, each being notable enough for one to become aware of it. For the minute insensi-
ble perceptions of some perfection or imperfection, which I have spoken of several times
and which are as it were components of pleasure and of pain, constitute inclinations and
propensities but not outright passions. So there are insensible inclinations of which we
are not aware (NE II, xxi, § 41; RB, 194).
Let us distinguish between two kinds of impulses, disquiet and passions. Their
difference is related to their object. Minute perceptions are related to pleasure
or pain and they form disquiet consisting of semi-pleasures or semi-sufferings
which is a general disposition, restlessness without a clear object. These com-
ponents of pleasure and pain are related to perfection and imperfection much
the same way as in Spinoza’s philosophy (I will return to this theme later). The
disquiet may find an object and become a known inclination or passion related
to that object.11 This is when mere disquiet transforms itself into a passion
with a clear object.
In itself this scheme is similar to Locke’s view of uneasiness and passions,
but epistemologically the change is from unconscious cognition to conscious
cognition. The question is one of degree, not of kind. When disquiet becomes
strong or pressing enough, one becomes aware of it and it becomes a passion.
In Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas Leibniz argues that affections of
the mind are clear and distinct notions:
10 This doctrine, added to later editions of the Essay, was influenced by Malebranche
(Vienne 1991), but is regarded as problematic in the context of Locke’s philosophy both by
Leibniz (NE II, xxi, § 47) and many contemporary commentators (see Lowe 2005, 135, and
Magri 2000, 64).
11 According to Leibniz, with passions and inclinations, we at least know what we want (II,
xx, § 6; RB, 166).
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A distinct concept, however, is the kind of notion which assayers have of gold: one,
namely, which enables them to distinguish gold from all other bodies by sufficient marks
and observations. We usually have such concepts about objects common to many senses,
such as number, magnitude and figure, and also about many affections of the mind such
as hope and fear; in a word, about all concepts of which we have a nominal definition
which is nothing but the enumeration of sufficient marks (GP IV, 423; AG, 24).
Thus Leibniz classifies passions, such as hope and fear, as clear and distinct
cognition which can be recognized and distinguished from other states of the
mind. Furthermore, being clear and distinct cognition, it can be apperceived
by the human mind. In this way they are very different from inclinations
formed by disquiet which are at most clear but confused perceptions, like
colours or flavours (G IV, 426). Disquiet does affect our deliberation, but it
does not lead us directly into action.
Hope
Although Leibniz mentions hope as an example of a passion or affection in
Meditations, his remarks on the emotion are scarce. In a memoir De affectibus
from 1679 Leibniz follows the Scholastic definition of hope as a “good opinion
of the future” (A VI, 4, 1416). While this definition is in line with his later
views, he discusses it more fully and adds some qualifications in NE, II, xx.
In E II, xx, § 9–10 Locke argues that the soul is content when it thinks of
a probable future enjoyment of a pleasant thing, that is, pleasure. This emotion
is hope which is connected to delight. Fear is the opposite. It rises in the form
of uneasiness when we think of future evil. Locke’s view of hope and fear are
consistent with his views of joy and sorrow. Hope is a state of delight which
follows from beliefs concerning future pleasures. If the belief is strong enough
(there is high probability of attaining the good), it leads us to action.
Theophilus, Leibniz’s representative in NE is at first neutral, but soon
brings out a very strong disagreement. True to his general account of joy and
sorrow, disquiet is not only related to displeasure but also to pleasure. Thus
he argues that there is disquiet both in fear and hope. When the representative
of Locke, Philalethes, presents a definition of hope as the contentment of the
soul which thinks ‘of a probable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to
delight’ (E, 231), Theophilus says:
If disquiet signifies displeasure, I grant that it always accompanies fear; but taking it for
that undetectable spur which urges us on, it is also relevant of hope. The Stoics took the
passions to be beliefs: thus for them hope was the belief in a future good, and fear the
belief in a future evil. But I would rather say that the passions are not contentment or
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displeasures or beliefs, but endeavours – or rather modifications of endeavour [tend-
ence] – which arise from beliefs or opinions and are accompanied by pleasure or displeas-
ures (NE II, xx, § 9, RB. p. 167).
Leibniz takes hope (and passions in general) to be related to desire (tendence;
Remnant and Bennett translate it as endeavour12), which arises from beliefs or
opinions rather than as beliefs as the Stoics (and Locke with them)
thought.13At this point it is useful to look at § 10. There Leibniz says: “Despair,
viewed as passion, will be a kind of strong endeavour which is utterly
thwarted, resulting in violent conflict and much displeasure” (RB, 167). If this
is applied to its opposite, one might say that hope is an endeavour, a general
desire which brings about pleasure. In Leibniz’s words, it is an “undetectable
spur which urges us on” (RB, 167).
Applying the scheme from an earlier section, we get the following picture:
the minute promises or signs of a future pleasure (semi-pleasures) may accu-
mulate to that of an expectation which motivates us to strive for the good
represented by it. The disquiet receives a direction or a goal and turns from
disquiet into a passion. In this way Leibniz can show that Locke’s uneasiness
is not necessarily a bad thing – the disquiet can be constitutive of positive
passions and can drive us to advance perfection and our own happiness.
Thus we can distinguish between different degrees of hope. The signs of
hope which are singular semi-pleasures give us promises of the future good,
forming a positive disquiet of hope, but when semi-pleasures accumulate and
converge in an apperceived expectation of some future good, leading us to a
certain object, a clear and distinct idea or a passion of hope arises, invokes
the will and leads to action. In this way hope can be understood as a disposi-
tion which has as an object some future good.
With his theory of disquiet Leibniz can combine the traditional view that
hope includes a belief or an opinion concerning a future good with his dynami-
cal world-view. Hope is a spur which is built up from minute little perceptions
12 Translating tendence as endeavour is problematic as Remnant and Bennett note in Leib-
niz 1996, lxi. The reason for this is that Leibniz uses the word in the meaning of tendency or
inclination of the mind, but also in the sense of conatus, a general desire or striving. I use
both endeavour (referring to general striving) and desires or inclinations (referring to singu-
lar dispositions in the human soul). In addition, Leibniz distinguishes between ‘appetitions’
and ‘volitions’ as we will see a little later.
13 Leibniz is probably referring here to Chrysippus who introduced the idea that an emotion
is an evaluative belief (doxa) or judgement (krisis) that there is good or bad at hand, accom-
panied by the judgement that it is right or proper to react emotionally. The first judgement
identifies a contingent object as good or bad, and the second is an assent to a hormetic
thought which is typically associated with seeing an object in this light. Knuuttila 2004, 53.
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and urges us on. Whereas in Locke’s model men fight the constant uneasiness
they feel and this restless state is seldom overcome by delight, in Leibniz’s
system the positive disquiet of hope can keep us alert, motivate our efforts at
developing ourselves and give us mental rewards. When it grows strong
enough, it can turn into a proper emotion of hope.
From the present-day perspective Leibniz’s conception of hope seems feasi-
ble, provided one accepts the perfectionist, God-centred framework to which
it is unavoidably connected. His conception of hope is also original with
respect to his contemporaries. For example, in II, § 58 of his Passions of the
Soul, Descartes argues that hope is the possibility to acquire a good and when
hope is extreme, it changes to confidence (CSM I, 375). Locke clearly shares
this view along with Malebranche (The Search After Truth V, 10, Malebranche
1997, 394). These philosophers follow the influential Stoic conception of pas-
sions as beliefs. Another common view is the Cartesian doctrine that we are
always aware of everything we perceive at each moment. The Leibnizian dis-
quiet, being a process which is founded mostly on unconscious little percep-
tions is clearly something different.
Although Leibniz has similar views on the relation of action and perfection
with Spinoza, as we will shortly see, the latter relates the affect of hope to
anticipation and defines it as an inconstant joy which has arisen from the
image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt. When the doubt
involved in the affect is removed, hope becomes confidence and fear, in turn,
despair (Ethics 3p18, Schol. 1; Spinoza 1994, 164–165). The difference from
Leibniz is clear – the anticipation is still an inconstant, uncertain state rather
than a gradual process with encouraging signs.
Perhaps closest to Leibniz’s views is Hobbes who thought hope to be an
appetite for a future pleasure which requires an expectation that it can be
reached (The Elements of Law, Part I: Human Nature; Hobbes 1994, 52–53).
However, for Leibniz future pleasure is related to perfection and this view is
very different from Hobbes’view according to which the will is determined by
the last desire or aversion in deliberation (Hobbes 1994, 71).
Hope and Joy
Hope is essentially related to joy which is the most important emotion for
Leibniz. Between hope and joy there seems to be a very close union, a kind of
symbiosis. In a short youthful dialogue Persuading a Skeptic (1679–1681) Leib-
niz emphasizes the continuity of hope and its close relation to joy:
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After moderate joy the most beautiful and useful emotion is hope, or rather that uniform
and durable joy, which is nothing but well grounded hope, since other joys are fleeting
whereas the joy of hope is continuous. I have noticed that only hope sustains courage as
well as curiosity: as long as it is reduced by annoyances, old age, illness, bothering
reflections about misery and the alleged vanity of human things – adieu our noble enter-
prises, à Dieu our beautiful researchers.14
Here hope is presented as constitutive of joy which Leibniz describes as well-
grounded hope. Joy coming from hope is continuous while joy coming from
sensual pleasures such as food and drink is fleeting. This is because hope is
related to intellectual activity such as curiosity and courage which again is
essential for the practice of science and promoting the common good. This
activity, again, is related to metaphysical perfection.
According to Leibniz, when our suffering is eventually overcome by pleas-
ure, our whole disposition changes from sadness to joy which Leibniz defines
as the pleasure of the mind or a sentiment of increase in perfection. Joy is an
intellectual feeling and when we receive it, we move from being passive to
being active, from imperfection to perfection. This change can be eventual or
sudden, depending on the situation. For example, if I have lost the key to my
apartment, I feel sadness. When I suddenly find it again, my mood changes
quickly from sadness to joy. An example of a long-term process would be a
deep depression where one eventually moves from sadness and passivity to
joy and activity.
Whereas joy and hope are regarded as passions of the soul, they are special
kinds of passions leading to the good – following Descartes one might say that
they are intellectual passions which lead us to action and perfection.15 Like
hope, joy can be understood as either a positive disquiet or a passion. It can
be a passion which has a clear object such as some event which can bring us
joy, say, an act of charity. On the other hand, we may receive joy from less
clear reasons – we can feel joyful even when we do not have a clear reason
for it.16
14 Conversation between Father Emery the Hermit and the Marquis of Pianese, Minister of
State of Savoy, which has yielded a Remarkable Change in this Minister’s Life, in Leibniz
2006, 192.
15 For Descartes, intellectual joy and sadness are not passions, properly speaking, for they
come into the soul by the action of the soul itself and not by the action of the body (Pas-
sions of the soul II, 147–148, CSM I, 381–382).
16 “[Joy] appears to me to signify a state in which pleasure predominates in us; for during
the deepest sorrow and amidst sharpest anguish one can have some pleasure, e.g., from
drinking or from hearing music, although displeasure dominates; and similarly in the midst
of the most acute agony the mind can be joyful, as happened with martyrs” (NE II, xx, § 7;
RB, 166. See also De publica felicitate, Leibniz 1948, 613).
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Leibniz’s argument is close to Spinoza’s which was that when our power
to maintain self-preservation increases, we would feel joy (pleasure) and when
it decreases we would feel sadness (pain). In his definition of joy [laetitia]
Spinoza argues that moving from inadequate ideas (smaller perfection) to
adequate ideas (greater perfection) increases our power and consequently our
joy; therefore we should increase our knowledge of God or nature (Ethics III,
P11, Scholium; Spinoza 1994, 161). The joy comes in degrees – the more
adequate ideas we have, the more perfect we will become and the more we
will understand God or nature. Leibniz’s argument is, again, very similar.17 He
says that joy makes men alert, active and hopeful of further success (NE II,
xx, § 8) and therefore it leads us to action and perfection. The more active the
substance, the more it receives joy and pleasure and the more there is hope
for future pleasures. Passion or suffering in an ideal case can be turned eventu-
ally to action and pleasure:
[…] if we take ‘action’ to be an endeavor towards perfection, and ‘passion’ to be the
opposite, then genuine substances are active only when their perceptions … are becoming
better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions
are becoming more confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of pleasure
and pain every action is a move towards pleasure, every passion a move towards pain
(NE II, xxi, § 72; RB, 210).
Hope as a rational appetite
Finally, I would like to return to the dynamical character of Leibniz’s concep-
tion of hope and discuss some implications of it for Leibniz’s ethics. We have
seen that for Leibniz passions are not beliefs as in the Stoics, but rather are
conscious desires which arise from them. Whereas the Stoics saw passions as
false judgements or disturbances of the mind which prevent happiness, Leibniz
regards them as both negative and positive endeavours. The Stoic term for
hope is appetite (epithumia) which is defined by Pseudo-Andronicus as fol-
lows: “Appetite is an irrational reaching out, or pursuit of an expected good”
(Knuuttila 2004, 51–52). For Leibniz, hope is more like a rational striving for a
lasting pleasure or happiness.18
17 There is one major difference, however, which is related to their different metaphysics.
According to Leibniz, action within the pre-established harmony signifies that one substance
affects another and passion that a substance is affected by another substance (See Monadol-
ogy, § 49–51 and Principles of Nature and Grace, § 3).
18 However, as Rutherford shows, Leibniz’s conception of hope can be compared to the
Stoic rational desire (boulêsis) which is a good emotional state (Rutherford 2003, 81).
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As moral progress is a central aspect of Leibnizian ethics, it is no wonder
he did not like Stoic ethics, although he comes fairly close to their views in
many ways. As Donald Rutherford has pointed out, Leibniz’s main argument
against the Neostoic currents in Descartes and Spinoza is based on the fact that
the Stoic ethics consists of patience without hope. The gist of the argument is
directed to the theological framework – when there is no divine justice but
mere destiny (fatum Stoicum), there is no hope that virtue will be rewarded
and the present state may seem unbearable (Rutherford 2003, 64–67).
Whereas Leibniz regards happiness as a continual systematic process, he
thinks that in Stoicism a lasting happiness is not possible, as there is no guar-
antee that destiny allows it to last. When one has hope or a reasonable expec-
tation of happiness as a result of a virtuous life, one is motivated to act virtu-
ously.19
As we saw, the rational striving for pleasure in Leibniz’s system is founded
on the “undetectable spur which urges us on”. The corresponding endeavour
to this appetite in the soul is will.
Volition is the effort or endeavour [conatus] to move towards what one finds good and
away from what one finds bad, the endeavour arising immediately out of one’s awareness
of those things. This definition has as a corollary the famous axiom that from will and
power together, action follows; since any endeavour results in action unless it is prevented
(NE II, xxi, § 5; RB, 72).
Our will is always directed to the good we are aware of and corresponds to
primitive active force and substantial form in Leibnizian metaphysics.20 The
disquiet, when it is related to pleasure leads eventually to action when a per-
son becomes aware of it.21 In this sense the “intellectual” disquiet (consisting
of semi-pleasures) which is related to intellectual passions is a rational striving
19 The same kind of criticism applies to ancient Stoicism which Leibniz describes in his fifth
letter to Clarke (§ 13): “The Stoical fate will have a man be quiet because he must have
patience whether he will or not, since it is impossible to resist the course of things. But ‘tis
agreed that there is a fatum Christianum, a certain destiny of everything, regulated by the
foreknowledge and providence of God” (GP VII, 391; Leibniz 1969, 697).
20 “It is true that active power is sometimes understood in a fuller sense, in which it com-
prises not just a mere faculty but also an endeavour; and that is how I take it in my theoriz-
ing about dynamics” (NE II, xxi, § 1; RB, 169).
21 Pauline Phemister offers a somewhat similar reading with the difference that she dis-
cusses in terms of appetites and distinguishes between noticeable appetites such as the
desire for food and true volitions which are rational or distinct appetites. It seems to me
that this view can be understood as being in agreement with the picture I have presented
(Phemister 2005, 248).
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for perfection. We might call this kind of striving ‘appetition’, following Leib-
niz’s argument in NE, II, xxi, § 5:
There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I
prefer to call these “appetitions” rather than volitions, for one describes as “voluntary”
only actions one can be aware of and can reflect upon whether they arise from some
consideration of good and bad; though there are also appetitions of which one can be
aware (RB, 173).
The difference between disquiet and volition is thus that, whereas the former
are usually unconscious, the latter is something we are aware of. Hope as an
intellectual disquiet can be considered as a rational appetite in the sense that
it leads us eventually to joy or pleasure of the mind. It can grow in us and
when it finds an object, fix our will to it and lead to a passion which mediated
by the will leads to action. One has to note, however, that there is a constant
conflict between different kinds of impulses in the human mind and there is
a threat that our positive inclinations are endangered by more confused desires
which draw the will to wrong goals. Leibniz describes the situation in NE, II,
xxi, § 39:
Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the
result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which
add up to a disquiet which impels us without our seeing why. There are some which join
forces to carry us towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear,
also accompanied by disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure.
Finally, there are some impulses which are accompanied by actual pleasure or suffering”
(NE xxi, § 39; RB, 192).
There are still some components in Leibniz’s moral psychology which need to
be taken into account. He argues that there is within us an innate principle of
pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow which is known by instinct. This principle
is a disposition to do good and to love other human beings. The principle is
not a truth of reason in the sense that it can be reached by finite analysis since
it is based on inner experience and confused cognition. The material provided
by the principle is thus very different from other innate ideas like the idea of
God (NE I, 1, § 1) which are clear and distinct ideas. In itself it could be com-
pared with animal instincts, since animals strive for the good that is suitable
for them (NE III, xi, § 8). In what follows I will refer to the innate principle as
moral instinct.
Whereas the will concerns only endeavours we are aware of, the moral
instinct offers us only confused, minute perceptions of pleasure and pain. Thus
it can be seen as constitutive of disquiet and explains why we in general strive
towards pleasure or joy and hope instead of suffering or pain. As we saw,
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pleasure is a feeling of perfection and in this way the moral instinct guides us
to strive for perfection. However, if our perceptions of pleasure and pain are
confused cognition, it is difficult to see how they can affect our will which
concerns things we are aware of (in Leibniz’s words, “[endeavour] arising
immediately out of one’s awareness of those things”)? Is the accumulation
of minute perceptions enough to explain this leap from (mostly unconscious)
appetitions to apperceived volitions? I think an answer can be found in Leib-
niz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, written two years before NE (also called
On What Is Independent Of Sense And Of Matter, GP VI, 499–508):
[…] In order to conceive numbers and even shapes distinctly and to build sciences from
them, we must reach something which sense cannot furnish but which the understanding
adds to it. Since therefore our soul compares the numbers and the shapes of colours, for
example, with the number and shapes discovered by touch, there must be an internal
sense where the perceptions of these different external senses are found united. This is
called the imagination, which comprises at once the concepts of particular senses, which
are clear but confused, and the concepts of the common sense, which are clear and dis-
tinct” (GP VI, 501; Leibniz 1969, 548).
When we explain the feeling of perfection which is the essence of hope and
joy, we must look at the internal sense or imagination. As we remember from
the description of clear and distinct ideas in Meditation, they (including hope
and fear) are objects common to many senses. Leibniz argues that besides
sensible and imaginable (numbers and shapes, for example), there is that
which is only intelligible, since it is the object of understanding alone (GP
VI, 501). The distinction leads to a further classification into three levels of
concepts:
1) sensible only (objects produced by each sense in particular)
2) at once sensible and intelligible (appertain to common sense)
3) intelligible only (belong to the understanding)
To the first category one can classify the clear, but confused perceptions of
sounds, colours, flavours and the like.22 The second level of concepts consists
of the concepts of the internal sense, which are common in the perceptions
of the external senses. Concepts, which are intelligible only are beyond our
imagination and are related to our reason. When we consider metaphysical
perfection, it is clearly sensible in the sense that it is felt as something, that
is, pleasure of the mind. It is a sentiment which is a feeling rather than an
object of the understanding; it brings about a harmonious feeling. However, it
22 In NE IV, vi, § 7 Leibniz argues that these kinds of perceptions should be called images
rather than qualities or ideas. RB, 404.
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can be argued that perfection must be more than mere feeling since it moti-
vates us morally. Thus feeling perfection is not only sensible, but also intelligi-
ble. It is related to our innate ideas, especially the clear and distinct idea of
God and his perfections. Perceiving perfection corresponds with the innate
ideas and can affect our volitions.23 Leibniz wrote to Bayle:
The most abstract thoughts need some imagination: and when we consider what confused
thoughts (which invariably accompany the most distinct that we can have) are (such as
those of colours, odours, tastes, of heat, of cold etc.) we realize that they always involve
the infinite, and not only what happens in our body but also, by means of it, what
happens elsewhere.24
The increase in universal perfection produces pleasure and decreases pain.
When the intellect finds that an appetition promises future pleasure, the moral
instinct is directed to it or “recommends” it. Similarly, when we feel pain our
moral instinct “tells” us in the form of mental pain that the deed we are about
to do is to be avoided. For example, if I find that my act of charity produces
pleasure in my mind, this affects my future volitions and can bring about a
virtuous habit to help my fellow men which promote the universal process of
perfection. The process is in line with Leibniz’s general definition of substance
as including only perception and appetite, the latter striving for “better” per-
ceptions, that is, more clear and distinct perceptions, avoiding confused and
obscure perceptions.
The goal of moral action is happiness which is founded on continual or
enduring joy.25 Hope is needed to ground this joy by sustaining courage and
curiosity as we saw in the previous section. When we act in a virtuous manner,
our reward is joy which is at its strongest when its source is universal perfec-
tion. This perception gives rise to love in us and when we promote the common
good, the object of our love is the Monarch of the Kingdom of grace, that is,
23 In NE I, ii, § 10 Theophilus argues: ‘I take it, sir, that you fundamentally agree with me
about these natural instincts for what is upright and good; although you will perhaps say, as
you did about the instincts which lead [us] towards joy and happiness, that these impres-
sions are not innate truths. But I have already replied that every feeling is the perception of
an innate truth, though very often a confused one as are the experiences of the outer
senses. Thus innate truths can be distinguished from the natural light (which contains only
what is distinctly knowable) as a genus should be distinguished from its species, since
innate truths comprise instincts as well as the natural light’ (RB, 94).
24 Reply to the comments in the second edition of M. Bayle’s Critical Dictionary, in the arti-
cle Rorarius, concerning the system of pre-established harmony (1702, G IV, 563–564; Leib-
niz 1998, 250).
25 laetitia; see Leibniz’s letter to Wolff 18. 5. 1715; AG, 233.
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God.26 Similarly, we feel mental pain when we perceive disharmony or a
decrease in universal perfection. The good we have done is reflected in the
world as increasing perfection and this can be considered as a positive sign or
promise which gives us hope and motivates us to act virtuously. Perfection is
perceived clearly, but confusedly as a harmonious feeling or beauty which
Leibniz defines as perceiving variety within unity.27 The source for this feeling
is God who has all the perfections.28
In the Leibnizian framework the perception of perfection creates joy or
pleasure of the mind in us and strengthens our hope which provides a continu-
ous objective for our joy. Joy, again, increases our activity, power and free-
dom – in other words, well-being, both mental and physical. Eventually, the
process of continuing and increasing joy can bring us lasting pleasure or hap-
piness (see NE II, xxi, § 51). Likewise, acting according to wrong goals can
weaken our hope and lead us to despair which brings pain and jeopardizes
our happiness.
By developing one’s use of reason the moral agent can replace one’s nega-
tive passions by positive passions or bad habits by good habits which lead us
to virtue.29 Like Aristotle, Leibniz recommends a thorough moral education for
men to become virtuous (NE, II, xxi, § 35). Hope for a future good arises out
of our daily little victories, successes of semi-pleasures against semi-sufferings.
Like joy, hope has to be cultivated; otherwise it may change into despair which
destroys our hope. When we strive for the good systematically, we can gather
hope which leads us to action and happiness. Hope can thus be considered as
a rational appetite in human life.
26 In a very Augustinian manner Leibniz argues in Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on
Reason, § 18: “…for the love of God also fulfills our hopes and leads us down the road of
supreme happiness” (GP VI, 606; AG, 213).
27 “Consonances please, since agreement is easily observable in them […] Agreement is
sought in variety, and the more easily it is observed there, the more it pleases; and in this
consists the feeling of perfection” (AG, 233). See also GP VII, 290.
28 “Knowledge of reasons perfects us because it teaches us universal and eternal truths,
which are manifested in the perfect Being […] One need not shun at all pleasures which are
born of intelligence or of reasons, as one penetrates the reason of the reason of perfections,
that is to say as one sees them flow from their source, which is the absolutely perfect Being
[…] God, who has done everything perfectly, cannot fail to arrange everything thus, to ele-
vate created being to the perfection of which they are capable through union with him,
which can subsist only through the spirit” (Felicity, Leibniz 1988, 83–84).
29 On the process of self-perfection, see Roinila 2006.
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